This paper describes the concept of corporeality in the context of science art and the role of technology in contemporary culture. Human corporeality is a body endowed with soul and meaning. It results from personal and social experience, historical development, or cultural context and its implicit impacts. The subject of this research is corporeal code that organize the nature of modern artistic productions and human being identity. Contemporary artists use the strategies of participation and interaction, forms of interventions to make (...) art an agent of social change and to become active drivers for the new identity process activation. Problems of identity make up a significant layer in contemporary art. The identification process develops in them in various directions. We can characterize its evolution as a change of identities. Recognizing the role and intense impact of technology on contemporary culture, we can trace two main directions: one involves extension of human senses and abilities by creating new solutions, software and tools, that let us get advanced understanding of the reality, and the second one is based on presupposed physical capacities of the human corporeality. According this approach the understanding of reality as a reality given in sensations is disappearing. The virtual world comes to replace it, our essence becomes involved in the process of mixing and indistinguishability until its complete disappearance. (shrink)

Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate (...) fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. (shrink)

The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...) are in a position to know that they are in bad faith. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a conditional parity thesis: if we are agents with respect to our intentions, we are agents with respect to our beliefs. In the final section, I motivate a categorical version of the parity thesis: we are agents with respect to belief and intention. My aim in this paper is to show that there is no unique challenge facing epistemic agency that is not also facing agency with respect to intention. My thesis is ambitious on (...) two fronts. First, the parity thesis is a substantive thesis about the nature of belief and intention. I argue that there is a structural parity of belief and intention; the status of whether they are agential stands and falls together. Second, the parity thesis illuminates the nature of agency. It constrains what counts as a satisfactory account of agency: either we must accept agency of both belief and intention, or we must reject both. In the final section, I argue that we have prima facie reason to accept agency of belief and intention. Finally, I diagnose why there has been such resistance to epistemic agency. Epistemic agency is problematic, but its problems are problems with agency, not problems with epistemic agency. (shrink)

Erasmus was one of the most widely read and controversial authors of the early modern period, inspiring a broad range of reader reactions. The present volume addresses various aspects of Erasmus's reception, including how the author's name was sometimes used to bolster decidedly "un-Erasmian" ideals.

Alvin Plantinga, in the ninth chapter ofThe Nature of Necessity, sets out a defence of the Free Will Defence (FWD)2. In what follows, I shall set out, to begin with, a statement of the main line of his argument3. I shall, then, set out a number of minor criticisms of the ninth chapter. Finally, I shall set out a criticism of Plantinga’s argument.

Our fascination with artificial intelligence (AI), robots and sentient machines has a long history, and references to such humanoids are present even in ancient myths and folklore. The advancements in digital and computational technology have turned this fascination into apprehension, with the machines often being depicted as a binary to the human. However, the recent domains of academic enquiry such as transhumanism and posthumanism have produced many a literature in the genre of science fiction (SF) that endeavours to alter this (...) antagonistic notion of AI. In his novel Klara and the Sun, Kazuo Ishiguro explores this notion of AI as a caring machine capable of nursing an ailing young girl back to health. Through this portrayal of AI as a sentient being capable of empathy and cognition, Ishiguro is attempting to usher in a new perception of AI: a posthuman perception that challenges the conventional notions of AI as a machine devoid of emotions. The novel further expands on the idea of self, soul and human consciousness and ponders on the question, what makes humans human, and if it is possible to imbibe these qualities onto an AI. Owing to the novelty of this notion, an unexplored avenue that deserves further exploration, this paper examines the plausibility of this new notion of AI through a careful exegesis of the novel. The paper also attempts to chart the impact of SF in society and culture. The study reveals a positive shift in perception towards AI, and there seems to be much scope for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Huggins, AK When the debate about gay marriage really started to gain some momentum in Australia, probably a year or two before the last Labor Party Conference, I predicted amongst some of my gay friends that, as we got closer to a vote or other defining moments in this process, people and organisations would start 'crawling out of the woodwork' with distasteful, even despicable ways to demonise same-sex partnership and indeed gay people generally. I was right. I also mentioned to (...) my friends that in Sydney, Cardinal Pell and Archbishop Jensen would wait just before any parliament vote to politicise their pulpits by locking in the federal Liberal vote using their lap boy Tony Abbott to deny a conscience vote amongst his party colleagues. I was right again. I also said that any attempt by a State or Territory to pass their own gay marriage legislation would be countered by a Liberal Government in the High Court of Australia. I was right again. It is so difficult and regrettable to be right all the time!! (shrink)

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because (...) it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection. (shrink)